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Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between individual altruistic attitudes 
and the incentives of participating in a climate coalition by using a laboratory 
experiment. A dominant strategy solution design assigns players into two roles 
in the game: critical and non-critical players. The critical players have a weakly 
dominant strategy of joining and are essential to an effective coalition. On the 
other hand, the non-critical players have a dominant strategy of not-joining. The 
theory suggests that strong altruism would lead non-critical players to join a 
coalition. The experimental evidence supports that coalitions are therefore 
enlarged from the self-interest prediction. However, the result indicates that the 
individual incentives for participation seem to be negatively correlated with 
altruistic attitudes. It implies the stronger the altruistic tendencies the less likely 
individuals are to join a coalition. In other words, coalition formation may be 
expanded by egoistic players.  
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1. Introduction 
International environmental agreements (IEAs) have been constructed to 
mitigate the greenhouse gas emissions that contribute to climate change. Since 
Barrett (1994), a large amount of literature (such as Barrett (2001), Bratberg, Tjøtta, 
and Ø ines (2005), Bahn et al. (2009), Breton, Sbragia, and Zaccour (2010), Finus 
and Rübbelke (2013)) has discussed this issue. Without any policy mechanism, 
the existing theoretical literature suggests that a large-scale IEA does not usually 
happen due to high levels of free riding. However, experimental studies 
(Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 2001, Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl 2009, Burger and 
Kolstad 2010) suggests that high levels of cooperation do exist. They claim that 
people are far less likely to offer a free ride and more likely to cooperate than the 
Nash prediction suggests. Therefore, social (or other-regarding) preferences have 
been proposed by recent studies (such as Charness and Rabin (2002), 
Dannenberg et al. (2012), Vogt (2016), Lin (2017)), to address this knowledge gap.  
Kosfeld, Okada, and Riedl (2009) discussed one of the major social preferences, 
inequality-averse preference, and claimed that the coalition size could be larger 
than a Nash equilibrium outcome. Grüning and Peters (2010) also agreed that, 
when the countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness, countries’ 
agreed abatement levels and level of cooperation both increase. In contrast to 
them, Kolstad (2014) argued that inequality-averse preferences could reduce the 
equilibrium size of a climate coalition. He claimed transfers among members is 
necessary to sustain cooperation. Lin (2017) also suggested that the coalition 
formation could be unstable due to individual inequality-averse attitudes. On the 
other hand, the inequity-averse preferences had poor performance in within-
subject tests (Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann 2011). Dannenberg et al. (2012) 
also questioned that ‚seeing the uncertainties in real world social dilemmas, the 
applicability of the F&S (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model beyond the lab is at least 
questionable.‛ 
This paper seeks to enrich the literature on IEAs by introducing individual 
altruistic attitudes. This is done for two reasons. Firstly, altruistic behaviours and 
high degrees of cooperation are rather commonly observed in public-good 
provision experiments Fischbacher (2007). Several recent studies of IEAs (e.g. 
McEvoy et al. (2014), van der Pol, Weikard, and van Ierland (2012)) examined 
altruism behaviour in a two-stage IEA game. They suggested a certain degree of 
altruism is sufficient to stabilise a grand coalition.  
Secondly, previous experimental studies, including McEvoy et al. (2014) and 
Burger and Kolstad (2010), allowed multiple coalition combinations exist. Such 
design may lead subjects make same decisions because they faced the same 
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payoffs. In other words, the discussion on social preferences was limited at the 
scope of coalitional formation, and the individual motivation has yet not been 
well explored. Hahn and Ritz (2014) examined strategic behaviours by assuming 
altruistic preferences may not directly reflect on the player’s behaviour and 
membership status. In other words, a player can behave differently than his or 
her true preference. They hypothesised that a country usually behaves less 
altruistically than its true preference. Their conclusion argued that as a result of 
this observed behaviour it may be difficult to infer social preferences. However, 
neither argument has been supported by empirical or experimental evidence.  
The following questions will be answered: Does individuals’ altruistic attitudes 
affect their decisions on participating in a climate coalition? How do their 
altruistic attitudes influence the coalition formation?  
This study examines the relationship of individual altruistic attitudes and 
incentives to cooperate by the theoretical prediction and the experimental 
evidences. A particular design was built by assigning players two roles in the 
membership game: critical and non-critical players: the critical players had a 
dominant strategy of joining and were essential to an effective coalition. By 
contrast, the non-critical players had a weakly dominant strategy of not-joining. 
With such design, this study could distinguish individual motivations on the 
participation.  
The theory predicts that strong altruism could lead individuals to participate 
in a coalition and thereby enlarge the coalition. Experimental evidence confirms 
that the coalition scale could be enlarged. However, the individual altruistic 
attitude seems to be negatively correlated with the incentive for cooperation: this 
means counter-intuitively that a coalition is usually enlarged by egoists.  
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a model of altruistic 
preferences. Following this, an experiment is designed to test the theory. Section 
4 reports the experimental outcomes and the data analyses. The final section 
presents the findings. 
2. The Model 
Considering 𝑁  heterogeneous players playing a two-stage game, the first 
stage is a membership game: players decide whether or not joining a coalition. 
The second stage is an abatement game: players decide their abatement level 
based on their membership status. We solve the game by backward induction.  
In the abatement game, the payoff function of a nonsignatory 𝑗 is its benefits 
from total abatement minus its individual abatement costs.   
𝜋𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗𝑋 − 𝑥𝑗     (1) 
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where 𝑥𝑗2 denotes the pollution abatement by player 𝑗, the marginal benefits3 
are ranked from high to low as 𝛾1 > 𝛾2 > ⋯ > 𝛾𝑁 , and 𝑋 is the total abatement 
from all players. The linear payoff function implies that countries either do no 
abatement or full abate. From (1), the optimal abatement of a nonsignatory 𝑗 is 
no abatement and the payoff is the marginal benefit times the overall abatement 
from signatories.  
By contrast, suppose that 𝑛 players (𝑛 ∈ [2,𝑁]) decide to join a coalition and 
choose a common abatement level to maximise their joint payoff, 𝛱,  
𝛱 = ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 = ∑ (𝛾𝑖𝑋 − 𝑥𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1     (2) 
From (2), signatories do full abate and an effective coalition is formed when 
their collective marginal benefit is more than the abatement cost. This mechanism 
also suggests a less unequal distribution of payoffs through transferring. The 
coalition members using transfers to equalise net payoffs between players may 
be an inferior assumption in studying IEAs. Because the cooperative coalition 
members decide a common abatement level and share the responsibility of 
maximising the coalition payoff, it is adequate to assume that the coalition payoff 
is equally shared by the members. In practice, members usually have equal 
voting rights in the international conventions. When the coalition payoff is 
equally shared, each signatory has the same payoff. Accordingly, the post-
redistribution payoff for a signatory 𝑖 is presented as 𝜋𝑖 = (∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − 1. 
We firstly consider a scenario when players are self-interested, a country’s 
welfare function is its own payoff function. A stable 𝑛-member coalition exists 
when d'Aspremont et al. (1983)’s internal and external constraints are satisfied.  
𝑈𝑖(𝑛) ≥ 𝑈𝑗(𝑛 − 1)     (3) 
The internal constraint (3) requires all signatories have no incentive to leave 
the coalition. In other words, the coalition size should be large enough to form an 
effective coalition which requires the collective marginal benefit of members 
being greater than the standard cost. When any signatory quits, the coalition 
collapse and all players gain nothing. Hence the internal constraint is written as 
∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 1 > 0. 
𝑈𝑗(𝑛) ≥ 𝑈𝑖(𝑛 + 1)     (4) 
On the other hand, the external constraint makes all nonsignatories, even the 
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one with the lowest free-riding benefit, have no incentive to be the (𝑛 + 1)-th 
member in the coalition. The external constraint can be presented as 𝑛𝛾𝑗 ≥
∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛾𝑗 − 1. 
In order to have a clear observation on individual decisions, Lin (2017) 
suggested a dominant strategy equilibrium condition4  
1 + 𝛾
𝑛
> ∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1      (5) 
When both constraints and the condition are satisfied, there exists only one stable 
coalition. Such setting categorises countries into two groups: the dominant 
strategy of critical players is joining an effective coalition and the dominant 
strategy of non-critical players is not to join an effective coalition. This condition 
implies that any critical country cannot be replaced by all of the non-critical 
countries. The condition ensured that the coalition formation is the only stable 
effective coalition. While we acknowledge this is indeed a strong condition, in 
order to have better observation of the individual decisions in the membership 
game, this setting provides a purified environment in the following experiment.  
Following, we consider another scenario with altruistic players. Altruistic 
decision makers not only concern about their own payoff but also other 
participants’ payoffs. Following Hahn and Ritz (2014), a player 𝑘  faces the 
following welfare function   
𝑈𝑘 = 𝜋𝑘 + 𝜃𝑘 ∑ 𝜋𝑘′𝑘′≠𝑘      (6) 
where 𝜃𝑘  denotes altruistic attitude of 𝑘, 𝜋𝑘 is the payoff of 𝑘, and 𝑘′ is any 
other player except 𝑘. The altruistic attitude parameter, 𝜃𝑘 ∈ [0,1], implies a 
concern about the payoffs of others. From formula (6), we have learnt that the 
welfare of 𝑘  is positively correlated with its altruistic attitude. Moreover, 
welfare is also positively correlated with the payoffs of others. This welfare 
function includes 𝑘’s own payoff and 𝑘’s altruistic attitude toward the others’ 
payoffs.  
Turning now to discuss the constraints of stable coalitions, the internal 
constraint (3) compares a signatory 𝑖’s welfare and the potential welfare of being 
a nonsignatory. The welfare of being a signatory, (∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 1) + 𝜃𝑖[(𝑛 −
1)(∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 1) + ∑ 𝑛𝛾𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=𝑛+1 ] , is higher than individual’s own payoff when 
altruism is considered. But the potential welfare of turning into a nonsignatory 
remains zero due to no payoff from a collapsed coalition. Hence the internal 
constraint still holds. By contrast, the external constraint (4) compares a 
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may happen. Hence individual decisions may not be predictable with only two constraints. 
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nonsignatory 𝑗’s welfare and the potential welfare of being a signatory. The 
welfare of nonsignatory 𝑗’s is (𝑛𝛾𝑗) + 𝜃𝑗[𝑛(∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 1) + (∑ 𝑛𝛾𝑗′𝑗′≠𝑗 )] and the 
potential welfare of turning into a signatory is (∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝛾𝑗 − 1) + 𝜃𝑗[𝑛(∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 +
𝛾𝑗 − 1) + ∑ (𝑛 + 1)𝛾𝑗′𝑗′ ] . When altruistic attitude parameter is positive, the 
external constraint may be violated. The violated constraint is because when the 
player becomes the (𝑛 + 1)-th member in the coalition, the spillover effects upon 
all other players enhance the welfare of the player. This implies that the 
becoming a signatory leads higher welfare from others, compared to being a 
nonsignatory. Therefore, if the internal constraint holds and the external 
constraint is violated, the altruistic attitudes could lead to a larger coalition than 
the outcome with self-interest.  
3. Experiment Design 
The experiment was conducted at the centre for Experimental Economics 
laboratory at the University of York in 2013 and programmed with z-Tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). Fifty students were invited through the Online Recruitment 
System for Economic Experiments (Greiner 2004). They were diverse in ethnicity, 
nation, and study major. This sample group mimics the diversity in the real 
world where international policy makers and multidisciplinary knowledge are 
present. Their political orientation and the level of belief in a religion were 
gathered as well. However, any content related to environmental issues had been 
excluded from the instructions to avoid biases due to subjects’ attitudes towards 
the environment.  
Appendix 1 shows the experiment instructions. The experiment contains two 
parts. The first part examined their individual altruistic attitudes. The second 
part assessed their motivation a public good game. The design took place as 
follows. 
3.1 Altruism test 
The altruism test is a dictator game developed from Andreoni and Miller (2002) 
and Bettinger and Slonim (2006) experiments. Subjects were anonymously and 
randomly paired with each other to make 20 ‘keep’ or ‘give’ decisions. In each 
round, each was given 1 token and decided whether to give it to their partners. 
They did not know whether or not to receive from their partners until the end of 
the session.  
The token means different monetary values for keeping and giving ( 1 and  2 
respectively). In order to capture indicate the subject’s altruistic attitude (𝜃), the 
ratio of keeping to giving values ( 1  2) was designed from 1 to 0.05 in 20 rounds. 
If players are self-interested and rational, this test has a dominant strategy that 
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they shall always keep the token. In other words, they are altruism when they do 
not follow the dominant strategy. The more frequent a subject gave the token 
means the subject was more altruistic.  
3.2 Membership Game  
As discussed in Section 2, signatories do full abate to form an effective 
coalition whilst nonsignatories do full pollute and free ride in the abatement 
game. Thus this experiment collapsed the two stages game into a single stage 
membership game: subjects only decide whether or not to join a coalition. 
Depending on their membership status, signatories do full abate whilst 
nonsignatories do full pollute.  
Having mentioned earlier, the feature of unique equilibrium coalition could 
offer a better observation on individual behaviour. Subjects were randomly 
assigned to groups of 5 persons for the whole session in anonymity5. Under the 
assumption of self-interest, with the constraints (3), (4) and condition (5), eight 
treatments were built for the stable coalitions. The stable coalition size in each 
treatment was either 2, 3 or 4.  
Subjects were given a payoff table which contains all 26 possible coalition 
combinations and their correspondent payoffs. Depended on their membership 
status and the coalition formation, their corresponding payoffs are different but 
in the range of £0 and £24. Everyone was asked repeatedly to make a decision on 
the membership status for 4 different treatments in 60 rounds. In the end of each 
round, their payoffs and the coalition formation would be revealed to everyone.  
4. Results and Analyses 
Table 1 shows the token’s values for keeping and giving and the number of 
subjects decided to give. In this altruism test, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
subjects all chose the dominant strategy to keep his/her tokens in the first round. 
However, when the ratio of keeping to giving values becomes smaller, more and 
more subjects would give their tokens away. In the final round, nearly 60% of 
subjects gave up the token for £0.5 to allow a stranger to earn £10. This result 
implies that more than half of the subjects had positive altruistic attitudes.  
  
                                                        
5 Subjects did not have the information about which role they were assigned and the stable coalition size.  
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Table 1. The token’s values for keeping ( 1), giving ( 2), the ratio of keeping to giving and the 
number of subjects decided to give  
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1 £1 £10 £7.5 £5 £2.5 £7.5 £5 £0.5 £5 £2.5 
 2 £1 £10.5 £8 £5.5 £3 £10 £7.5 £1 £10.5 £5.5 
 1  2 1 0.95 0.94 0.91 0.83 0.75 0.67 0.5 0.48 0.46 
Number of 
Giving 
0 3 7 7 8 8 8 20 14 9 
 
Round 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 1 £1 £2.5 £2.5 £0.5 £1 £1 £0.5 £1 £0.5 £0.5 
 2 £2.5 £7.5 £10 £2.5 £5.5 £7.5 £5 £10.5 £7.5 £10 
 1  2 0.4 0.33 0.25 0.2 0.18 0.13 0.1 0.095 0.07 0.05 
Number of 
Giving 
17 15 17 23 18 18 24 21 25 29 
 
In general, an increasing trend is noticed that subjects became altruistic when 
the token was more valuable to receivers than to givers. However, there were 
multiple switching points when the value of keeping to giving decreases. This 
implies that the value to the giver was an important factor in a subjects’ decision-
making. When the opportunity of giving was small (e.g. rounds 8, 14, and 17), 
subjects were more likely to behave altruistically by giving it up.  
Regarding the effects of subjects’ personal characteristics, the results of one-
way analysis of variance show that the effects of age, field of study, and ethnicity 
groups were insignificant with respect to subjects’ altruistic attitudes. Table 2 
reports the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation of altruistic preference. The 
dependent variable is the number of times giving the token. Independent 
variables are the subject’s age, political attitude (from left-wing as 1 to right-wing 
as 5), and religious attitude (from atheism as 1 to religionist as 5). Religious 
attitude is positively correlated to the altruistic attitude at a 10% significance 
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level, whilst no significant relationship between altruistic attitudes and other 
factors include age and political attitudes. The result suggests that the subjects 
who identified themselves as religionists behaved altruistically in this 
anonymous altruism test. 
Table.2. OLS Regression Estimation of Altruistic Attitudes (Times of Giving the Token) 
Variable OLS 
Constant term 203.35 (403.35) 
Age −0.1  (.20) 
Political attitude −0.69  (1.01) 
Religious attitude 1.19 ∗   (.63) 
Adjusted R Square 0.012 R-squared 0.07 
Total Observation 50   
Note: Each cell contains coefficient and standard error in parenthesis, ∗ means 10% significant 
level 
Turning now to the membership game, subjects became less cooperative when 
they learned about the decisions of others. In the first round, when they did not 
know each other’s decisions, more than 90% of 110 critical observations and 60% 
of 90 non-critical observations decide to join. Compared to other observations, 
the level of cooperation was higher when they had not learned the historic data. 
When they knew the historical records of decisions, only 85% of 1,540 critical 
observations and 46% of 1,260 non-critical observations decided to join. This 
result shows that subjects were cooperative if they did not learn other players’ 
decisions. In particular, when they were non-critical players, more than half of 
the observations were cooperative. But their behaviour changed when they learnt 
from the historical data.  
With the unique equilibrium setting, the coalition formation is one of the key 
discussions in this study. It is worth noting that coalitions are usually unstable as 
in the findings of Burger and Kolstad (2010) and other literature. The result 
rejects the hypothesis that public good decisions were motivated by self-interest. 
In other words, the coalition formation could be influenced by individual social 
preferences.  
To have a better understanding of the individual decisions in the membership 
game, the observations are examined by binary regressions in Table 3. The 
variables are the individual’s decision made in the former round (past decision), 
a dummy variable which indicates the role of critical player as 1 whilst that of 
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non-critical player is 0 (player role), the times of giving in the altruism test 
(altruistic attitude), the year of birth (age), political attitudes (from left-wing as 1 
to right-wing as 5), religiosity (from atheism as 1 to religionist as 5), and the 
marginal benefit from the total contribution (marginal benefit) and the total 
coalitional in the former round (past contribution). Decisions were made by 50 
subjects in 56 rounds; hence there are 2,800 observations from the membership 
game6.  
Table 3. Binary Estimations of Probability of Joining a Coalition 
Variable Binary(1) Binary(2) Binary(3) Binary(4) Binary(5) 
Constant 
−8.53 
(22.45) 
−9.67 
(16.96) 
1.83 
(0.10) 
0.34 
(15.89) 
−0.03 
(0.07) 
Past Decision 
1.85 ∗∗∗ 
(0.11) 
1.23 ∗∗∗ 
(0.12)  
0.98 ∗∗∗ 
(0.08)  
Player role 
1.98 ∗∗∗ 
(0.20)     
Altruistic attitude 
−0.01 
(0.01) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
−0.01 
(0.01) 
−0.01 
(0.14) 
−0.02 ∗∗ 
(0.01) 
Age 
0.004 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01)  
−0.00 
(0.008)  
Political attitude 
0.07 
(0.06) 
−0.11 ∗∗ 
(0.05)  
0.16 ∗∗∗ 
(0.04)  
Religious attitude 
−.061 ∗ 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03)  
−0.10 ∗∗∗ 
(0.03)  
Marginal benefit 
−2.02 ∗∗∗ 
(0.62) 
−0.75 ∗∗∗ 
(0.25)  
−5.21 ∗∗∗ 
(1.03)  
Past contribution 
−0.09 
(0.19) 
−0.11 
(0.18)  
−0.14 
(0.14)  
Total Observation 2800 1540 1650 1260 1350 
Decision of Joining 1884 1308 1410 576 629 
Log likelihood −1321.26 −565.87  −683.96 −737.33 −930.17 
Note: Each cell contains coefficient and standard error in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ mean significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
 
Binary(1) examines all factors through 2,800 observations. The subjects decide 
to join the coalition 1884 times. The factors for decisions in the former round and 
the player role have a significant positive effect on the decision. This is intuitive, 
and means that subjects were usually consistent with the decisions they made 
before and usually pursue higher payoffs. On the other hand, the factors of 
marginal benefit and religious attitude have a significantly negative impact. An 
                                                        
6 When the decisions in the former round are considered, the first round observations of treatments are not included. 
Hence, we have 2,800 observations for the regression estimations.  
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intuitive explanation is that subjects were less likely to cooperate when the free-
riding benefit was high. In addition, the religionists were less cooperatively in 
the coalition game. This result contradicts the earlier result in the altruism test 
and requires more attention to detail.  
Since subjects were given two roles in the game, the analyses examine 
individual social preferences and decisions separately. Binary(3) and Binary(5) 
use 1,650 and 1,350 observations include the first round data to examine the 
relationship between individual altruistic attitudes and the decisions of critical 
and non-critical players respectively. Surprisingly, at the 5% significance level, 
the lower altruistic attitude would lead a non-critical subject to participate in a 
coalition. This result is in contrast to our intuition. 
In order to understand this surprising result, a full consideration with all 
possible factors is required. Binary(2) and Binary(4) examine critical players with 
1,540 and non-critical players with 1,260 observations respectively. Binary(2) 
suggests that, when subjects were critical, the internal constraint was violated by 
15% of the observations. The result shows that the decisions of critical players 
were affected by their past decisions, marginal benefit and political preference. 
As mentioned earlier, the coalition members share the collective payoff equally, 
members face the same collective marginal benefits rather than individual 
marginal benefits. Having said that, the design in this study implies that the 
higher marginal benefit critical players have, the less number of critical players 
required to an effective coalition. In other words, critical players were less likely 
to cooperate when they were small number. In addition, the result also suggests 
that left-wing critical players were more likely to obey the internal constraint by 
joining a coalition.  
Binary(4) suggests that, when subjects were non-critical to the coalition, the 
external constraint was violated in about 55% of the observations. Political 
attitude is significantly positive to participation as left-wingers were more likely 
to follow the constraint by not joining a coalition. Comparing this with the result 
of Binary (2), it seems that left-wing non-critical subjects attempted to pursue 
higher payoffs. This interesting result might imply something about the core of 
environmental policies of left-wing parties. Due to the sample constraint, the 
implication cannot be extended but remains an interesting point for further 
studies. Regarding the religious attitudes, non-critical religionists are less likely 
to join a coalition. It implies that a lower religious attitude leads to a stronger 
motivation to participate.  
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the impact of individual altruistic attitudes on the 
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willingness to participate in a climate coalition. The theoretical result suggests 
that the coalition formation could be enlarged by the participation of altruists. 
The unique equilibrium design is one of the main characteristics of this study 
used to investigate individual motivation by assigning players two dominant 
strategies.  
The experimental results confirm the existence of altruism among 60% of the 
subjects. The altruistic attitudes are significantly correlated to religious attitudes, 
such that a stronger belief leads to a higher altruistic attitude. Following, the 
result in the membership game indicates that the coalition size was usually larger 
than the self-interest prediction. The incentives for participating in a coalition 
were examined by the binary estimations.  
This study provides several intuitive implications: subjects had consistent logic 
and pursue higher payoffs. Usually, subjects followed the weakly dominant 
strategies when they were critical to the coalition. When they became non-critical, 
higher altruistic attitudes would lead to lower incentives of joining a coalition. It 
implies that one-way altruistic subjects had less motivation to give up the free-
riding benefit in the interactive game. The coalition formation, on the contrary, 
was more likely to be expanded by the egoists. The result implies that decision 
makers are not self-interested in the international convention. However, the 
decision process is too complicated to be captured by one-way social preferences. 
Altruists might expect reciprocation in the interactive game.  
Moreover, the subjects’ preferences significantly affect their decisions. The left-
wingers were more likely to cooperate if they were critical and disobliging when 
they were non-critical. This interesting result implies that they had less 
motivation to give up the free-riding benefit by joining a coalition. Another 
important aspect of self-awareness is that religionists were less likely to join a 
coalition. Particularly when subjects were non-critical players, a higher religious 
attitude leaded to a weaker motivation to participate. Subjects with a stronger 
religious belief behaved altruistically. However, this does not mean that a higher 
religious attitude would lead to an altruistic decision in the interactive game.  
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Appendix 1. Experiment Instructions 
Please read the following instructions carefully. 
    You will have the guaranteed show-up fee £3. On top of that, you may – depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of others – earn more. There are three Parts in this experiment; in 
each Part there are several Rounds. The payoffs in each Round are independent: which means 
that the payoff in any one Round does not affect your payoffs in the following Rounds. At the 
end of each Part, a particular Round will be randomly selected and that will determine your 
payoff from that Part. Your total payment for this experiment is the sum-up your payoffs from 
these 3 Parts, plus the possible payoff from your partner in Parts 1 and 2. You will be paid in cash 
at the end of the experiment. 
    These Instructions are for your information. All subjects have identical Instructions. The 
experiment is anonymous. Please do not communicate with other participants during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, please let the experimenter know and he will answer you 
privately. We fear that if you violate this rule, we will have to exclude you from further 
participation in the experiment. 
    Before starting the experiment, please answer the following questions: 
 your user number, which is on the top of your monitor 
 your major (Business, Economics, Humanities, Science, Laws, Engineering, 
Psychology, Others, pick up the one you belong to) 
 your gender (male or female) 
  the year you were born (in 4-digit format, e.g. 1980) 
 your ethnicity (White, Mixed/multiple ethnic group, Asian/Asian British, 
Black/African/Caribbean/Black British, Other ethnic group)  
 what level do you consider yourself as a religionist? (from 0 is no religion to 5 is 
religionist) 
 what is your political preference? (0 is left, 1 is centre-left, 3 is neutral, 4 is centre-right 
and 5 is right) 
    The information will be kept confidential and used only in this study. 
    After answering the questions above, please click the "Start" button on your screen to 
proceed to the next stage of the experiment.   
Part 1 
    This is a decision problem. Your partner is reshuffled. He or she may be different to your 
partner in Part 1. Your identity and decisions will remain anonymous and confidential. There will 
be 20 rounds in this Part, preceded by a trial round for you to familiarise yourself with the game. 
In each round you will be asked to take a simple decision. Your payoff for this Part will depend 
upon your decision in a randomly chosen one of the 20 real rounds.  
You are given 1 ‘token’ to share with your partner. There are 2 options for you to choose. 
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 In Option 1, you keep the token. 
 In Option 2, you give the token to the partner. 
The value of the token to you and to your partner may differ, and are different in different rounds. 
There is an example of the decision problem on the screen.  
In each round, you will be given 30 seconds to make your decision. Your decision will be counted 
as Option 2 if you do not take a decision in these 30 seconds. At the end of Part 2, one of the 20 
real rounds will be randomly chosen to determine your payment and that of your partner. The 
money you get from both your and your partner’s decisions in this round will be paid to you at 
the end of the experiment. 
Control Questions 
    The following questions are designed to help your understanding of the experiment. 
    Q1) Does the decision in one Round affect the decision in another Round? 
    Q2) Does the partner know your decision? 
    Given that the value of the token is 50p for you and £1 for your partner. 
    Q3) How much you get if you choose Option 1? 
    Q4) How much you get if you choose Option 2? 
 
Part 2 
This Part is different from Parts 1 and 2, in that you are now in a Group with 4 other players in 
this room. Your identity and decisions will remain anonymous and confidential. You will be 
indicated as a particular player in the Group, such as ‘Player 1’, ‘Player 2’ and so on. You will 
remain in this role in the same Group in Part 3. Your payoff depends on the combination of your 
and other 4 players’ decisions.     
Your payoff for this Part will depend upon your decision in a randomly chosen one of the 60 real 
rounds. The whole session will take about 50 minutes. 
In each round of this Part, you and each of the other 4 players in you Group have simply to 
decide, simultaneously and independently, whether or not to join a coalition with the other players. 
If you decide to join, please click ‘YES’. If you decide not to join, please click ‘NO’. If 2 or more 
players in your Group decide to join a coalition, then a coalition is said to be formed. If no-one 
decides to join, or if only 1 decides to join, then a coalition is not formed. If a coalition is not 
formed, everyone gets nothing. 
There follows a sample payoff table, in which ‘IN’ means that the player has chosen to join the 
coalition and ‘OUT’ means that they have not.  
 For the Trial Round and Rounds 1 to 15, please read Table 1. 
 For Rounds 16 to 30, please read Table 2. 
 For Rounds 31 to 45, please read Table 3. 
 For Rounds 46 to 60, please read Table 4. 
No one will know the decisions of the other players in the Group until all have made their 
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decisions. When all have done so, all will be told the payoffs and decisions of all the players in 
the Group. Your decision has to be made within 180 seconds; otherwise the system will count 
your decision as that of ‘not joining’. 
Control Questions 
    The following questions are designed to help your understanding of the experiment. 
Q1) Does the decision in one Round affect the decision in another Round? 
Q2) In any Round do you know who has decided to join your Coalition before you take your 
decision?  
Suppose that you are Player 3 in the Sample Table below.  
Sample Payoff Table  
PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 PLAYER 3 
PLAYER 
4 
PLAYER 5 
IN 5.25 IN 5.25 IN 5.25 OUT 9 OUT 6.75 
IN 4.5 IN 4.5 OUT 11.25 IN 4.5 OUT 6.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 1.5 IN 1.5 OUT 7.5 OUT 6 OUT 4.5 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
Q3) Given the payoff table, Players 1 and 2 decide to join, and Player 4 and 5 decide not to join. 
How much you get if you choose ‘YES’? (Note: Given you are Player 3) 
Q4) Given the payoff table, Players 4 decides to join, and Player 1, 2 and 5 decide not to join. How 
much you get if you choose ‘NO’? (Note: Given you are Player 3) 
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Table 1. Payoff Table in Trial Round and Rounds 1 to 15 
PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 PLAYER 3 PLAYER 4 PLAYER 5 
IN 10.5 IN 10.5 IN 10.5 IN 10.5 IN 10.5 
IN 8.25 IN 8.25 IN 8.25 IN 8.25 OUT 9 
IN 7.5 IN 7.5 IN 7.5 OUT 12 IN 7.5 
IN 6.75 IN 6.75 OUT 15 IN 6.75 IN 6.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 5.25 IN 5.25 IN 5.25 OUT 9 OUT 6.75 
IN 4.5 IN 4.5 OUT 11.25 IN 4.5 OUT 6.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 3.75 IN 3.75 OUT 11.25 OUT 9 IN 3.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 1.5 IN 1.5 OUT 7.5 OUT 6 OUT 4.5 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
Every player gets “0 ” for any other combination 
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Table 2. Payoff Table in Rounds 16 to 30 
PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 PLAYER 3 PLAYER 4 PLAYER 5 
IN 6 IN 6 IN 6 IN 6 IN 6 
IN 4.5 IN 4.5 IN 4.5 IN 4.5 OUT 6 
IN 3 IN 3 IN 3 OUT 12 IN 3 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 1.5 IN 1.5 IN 1.5 OUT 9 OUT 4.5 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
Every player gets “0 ” for any other combination 
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Table 3. Payoff Table in Rounds 31 to 45 
PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 PLAYER 3 PLAYER 4 PLAYER 5 
IN 12.75 IN 12.75 IN 12.75 IN 12.75 IN 12.75 
IN 10.5 IN 10.5 IN 10.5 IN 10.5 OUT 9 
IN 9.75 IN 9.75 IN 9.75 OUT 12 IN 9.75 
IN 6.75 IN 6.75 OUT 24 IN 6.75 IN 6.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 7.5 IN 7.5 IN 7.5 OUT 9 OUT 6.75 
IN 4.5 IN 4.5 OUT 18 IN 4.5 OUT 6.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 3.75 IN 3.75 OUT 18 OUT 9 IN 3.75 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 1.5 IN 1.5 OUT 12 OUT 6 OUT 4.5 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
Every player gets “0 ” for any other combination 
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Table 4. Payoff Table in Rounds 46 to 60 
PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 PLAYER 3 PLAYER 4 PLAYER 5 
IN 3 IN 3 IN 3 IN 3 IN 3 
IN 1.5 IN 1.5 IN 1.5 IN 1.5 OUT 6 
IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 IN 0 
IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 OUT 0 
IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 OUT 0 IN 0 
OUT 0 OUT 0 OUT 0 IN 0 IN 0 
Every player gets “0 ” for any other combination 
 
 
 
